Re: Debate con William Lane Craig
reasonable to believe that it is not good overall in the long term.
Most theists are committed to that commonsense standard, even
though it does not follow from any essential Christian doctrine. They
have reason to accept it, because without it they would be lost in
their everyday lives. They might end up burning down their houses!
Craig seems to think that this standard is undermined by my claim
that “we have no more reason to believe that the evil now will lead
to great bliss in the long term than that this evil will lead to great
misery.” (118) However, my point was that, without any reason to
believe that either long-term effect is more likely than the other,
possible long-term benefits are canceled by possible long-term costs.
But short-term consequences are another matter. We can still know
a lot about the evil now and its short-term costs, at least in the cases
that I was discussing. What is known about these evils then sets up
a presumption that is not rebutted by any other reasons. That is why
my admission of ignorance about long-term effects supports my argument
rather than undermines it in the way that Craig suggests.
This commonsense standard leads right into my argument. We
know that evil occurs, as premise (2) says. The existence of that evil
sets up a presumption. This presumption is never overcome, because
we have no reason to believe that this evil is logically necessary for
any adequate compensation in either the short term or the long term.
I supported this premise by ruling out the many proposed justifications
of evil. The presumption plus the absence of any rebuttal makes
it reasonable to believe that the evil is not good overall. That, in turn,
makes it reasonable to believe that there is no all-good and allpowerful
God.
So far I have focused on standards for when beliefs are reasonable,
but my arguments against proposed justifications of evil also
employ a different kind of standard, namely, standards for when
compensation is adequate. Here again I claim that my standards are
commonsense principles that most Christians accept, along with almost
everyone else.
For example, Craig suggests that God’s reason for allowing babies
to suffer and die might be a combination of heaven and virtue:
The babies go to heaven, and other people develop moral virtue. In
Chapter 4, I pointed out that an all-powerful God could send the
babies straight to heaven without the evil, but Craig responds, “that
144 God?
forgets the Virtuous Response: so doing would short-circuit God’s
work in the lives of the parents or other people.” (116) I didn’t forget
that. Rather, I assumed that gains to other people would not be
adequate compensation for harm to the baby, for reasons that I gave
in my very next section on the Virtuous Response. One reason is that
an all-powerful God would have at His disposal less harmful ways
to teach lessons. Another reason is that it would be unfair to let the
baby suffer just to help separate individuals. Here I was appealing
to a commonsense standard of adequate compensation, namely, that
it is morally wrong to use some people merely as means to benefit
other people, at least when one could benefit those other people in
a less harmful way. This standard would be accepted by consequentialists,
by Kantians, and also by defenders of the natural law
doctrine of double effect (since, in the relevant case, God would intend
harm as a means, thereby violating this doctrine). This standard
is not completely clear, but surely one example is letting a baby
die painfully merely to teach a moral lesson to other people, when
one has less harmful ways to teach those other people. Any human
who did this would be considered a moral monster, so the same compensation
also should not count as adequate for God.
Craig complains about my analogies, so I should explain why I
use them. I admit that analogies are dangerous. One reason is that
opponents can always find some disanalogy. No analogy is perfect.
But, also, not every difference matters. The analogy still works if the
differences that do exist do not matter. So analogies can be useful
when theists would simply deny any direct claim about God. If theists
admit the analogous case, their admission reveals their commitment
to a general principle, and then the burden is on them to explain
why that general principle does not apply to God. That is the
strategy behind my analogies. I am trying to show that common sense
commits you to the premises of my argument. If you agree with me
about my everyday examples, that admission reveals your own standards
for reasonable belief or adequate compensation. My argument
simply applies those same standards to belief in God.
Craig suggests that Christians might deny that such common standards
apply to God: “I am bound by certain moral obligations and
prohibitions vis à vis my neighbor (e.g., not to take his life); but God
(if He has moral duties at all) is not bound by many of these (e.g.
Atheism Undaunted 145
He can give and take life as He pleases).” (115) Of course, if God
is all-powerful, then God is able (in the sense of having the power)
to “take life as He pleases.” However, that ability shows nothing
about “moral obligations and prohibitions.” So I take Craig’s final
parenthetical claim to be that there is nothing morally wrong with
God killing anyone at any time for any reason, no matter how trivial
the reason is. In this view, people have no more rights than mosquitoes
with respect to God. Why not? Maybe because God is so
powerful. But might does not make right. Maybe because God created
us. But parents are prohibited from killing the children whom
they create and nurture. Why? Because the children are separate
people with rights. This reason applies to God as well. If God gave
us free will, then He made us separate people, so why wouldn’t we
have rights not to be killed by Him needlessly? I see no good reason
to exempt God from moral standards, so I assume that He would
not be justified in letting babies suffer and die merely as a means to
benefit other people when he has better alternatives.
If Craig continues to insist that God is morally permitted to “take
life as He pleases,” then his obstinacy will strike many people as desperate.
Most Christians will hope for a better response. After all,
God is supposed to be all-good. Craig’s response admits that God
violates the only moral standards that we know. If God’s goodness
is compatible with letting babies die painfully merely as a means to
help other people when God could use less harmful means to help
those other people, then this is a kind of goodness that we do not
understand or have any reason to care about. Why should we love
or worship a God who does such things? It might sound neat to say
that God is not subject to our standards, but this ploy leaves it unclear
what it is that makes God good. In the end, we need to use
our own standards, because we cannot understand any others.
Luckily, Craig gives other responses. Sometimes he argues that
all evil can be justified in terms of common moral standards. What
a theist needs is for each bit of evil to be justified by something.
Theists do not need a single justification to cover all bits of evil. They
can use different justifications for different bits of evil, as long as
every bit ends up being justified. Craig accuses me of forgetting this
logical point by adopting a “divide and conquer” strategy. I plead innocent.
I did not “typically refute . . . a solution by arguing that it
146 God?
cannot cover all cases of suffering,” (115) as Craig charges. Instead,
I gave several examples, such as birth defects, and argued that no
proposed compensation, either alone or in combination with others,
is adequate to justify the evil in those specific cases. Even if “the solutions
are complementary and mutually reinforcing” (116) when
they apply, that does not show that they do apply to the cases in my
argument. Besides, I argued (four paragraphs back) that the solutions
do not mutually reinforce each other in the way that Craig
claims, at least in the examples that I gave. So, far from “divide and
conquer,” my strategy was to focus my forces in a few examples that
undermine all proposed justifications together.
Later in Chapter 5, Craig does propose one justification that might
seem to solve the problem of evil, if it worked. He claims that “the
purpose of life is . . . knowing God,” (120) and “it is precisely in
countries that have endured severe hardship that evangelical Christianity
is growing at its greatest rates.” (121) This is supposed to show
that severe hardship serves the purpose of life.
The first problem here is that Craig’s factual claim is dubious at
best. He cites Johnstone on China as one example. (121) Reportedly,
harsh persecution of Christians during Mao’s Cultural Revolution
was followed by unparalleled growth in the number of Christians.
This report should come as no surprise, because it must be based
on what people communicated about their beliefs. The number of
people who are willing to publicly proclaim their Christianity is likely
to go down while Christians are persecuted harshly, even if the number
of believers does not go down. Anyway, let’s grant for now that
the number of Christians did go way down under Mao, because of
fear and inability to obtain information about Christianity. That low
point would explain why many people in China did become Christians
when information became available and fear was removed. But
the number of Christians is still probably less than what it would
have been if there had been no persecution in the first place. That
comparison is the relevant measure of whether the evil of persecution
led to more knowledge of God. So neither Craig nor Johnstone
is justified in calling Mao “the greatest evangelist in history.” (121)
Most importantly, even if Mao’s policies did increase the number
of Christians, Craig himself says, “It is estimated that 20 million Chinese
lost their lives during Mao’s Cultural Revolution.” (121) To gloAtheism
Undaunted 147
rify such a tragedy dishonors the memory of the victims. Surely an
omnipotent God could find a less costly way to produce Christians
in China.
Craig also mentions El Salvador and Ethiopia. I will not discuss
those cases here because similar points apply. Even if the number
of Christians does go up after tragedies, there is no reason to think
that an all-powerful God could not find a less harmful way to help
people come to know and love Him.
Besides, if every such tragedy really were necessary for a higher
purpose, then we ought to welcome tragedies and not fight them.
We should let Mao persecute the Chinese, and let earthquakes destroy
lives in El Salvador, and let famines ravage Ethiopia, and so
on. If all such tragedies were God’s plan, to interfere in any of them
would be to interfere in God’s plan and to prevent the greater good
of more people becoming Christian. Luckily, not all Christians hold
such beliefs. Many Christians work hard against evils in this world.
But Craig suggests a different view of tragedies when he says that
so many deaths and so much suffering are a “slight, momentary affliction”
that “only serves to heighten mankind’s moral responsibility
before God.” (123) Such a view takes away our incentive to help
each other in this world. Beliefs with this result should be avoided,
at least in the absence of any reason to accept them. And nothing
that Craig says gives us any reason to accept such a view or to believe
that tragedies like those in China, El Salvador, and Ethiopia
really do cause growth in evangelical Christianity or serve any worthwhile
purpose.
Although Craig fails to specify why God allows evil, he has one
move left. He claims that his arguments for the existence of God
show that God must have some reason to allow evil, even if we cannot
figure out what it is. The conclusion that God has some unknown
reason is supposed to follow from Craig’s arguments for the existence
of God.
Unfortunately, this move is no better than his arguments for the
existence of God. I already argued at length in Chapter 2 that Craig’s
arguments for God fail miserably. I have seen no reason to take any
of that back. Later, in Chapter 5, Craig merely repeats his claims
that “my moral argument, if cogent, certainly does prove that God
is all-good; and the cosmological argument certainly shows that the
148 God?
Creator of the universe out of nothing has sufficient power to prevent
the evils that afflict our world.” (125) Again, Craig merely assumes
without any argument that the “God” who is all-good is the
same person as the creator. That assumption begs the question here,
since the existence of evil is compatible with one being who is allgood
and another separate being who is all-powerful. Besides, even
if the moral argument were cogent evidence for some personal
source of objective value (which it is not), it still would not “certainly
. . . prove” that this source is all-good, since this source might fail
its own objective standards of goodness. Regarding his claims for his
cosmological argument, notice that Craig’s use of the assuring term
“certainly” is again misleading, since it is not at all certain that something
powerful enough to create the whole universe around fifteen
billion years ago was ever all-powerful, is still alive today, or is able
to prevent every specific occurrence of evil. Many things that are
powerful on a large scale (such as a supernova or the Big Bang) do
not last forever and are as clumsy as a bull in a china shop when it
comes to small details. Similarly, it might not be within a creator’s
abilities or job description to fix genetic defects in suffering children.
Of course, if a traditional God did exist, then, by definition, He
would have “sufficient power to prevent the evils that afflict our
world.” But that would hardly show that God does exist. Indeed,
God’s supposedly unlimited power is exactly what creates the problem
of evil and, thereby, demonstrates that God does not exist.
Craig’s arguments for the existence of God need to be much better
than these in order to give us adequate reason to believe that all evil
is justified in ways that we cannot see.
Craig does formulate one new argument when he claims that “evil
. . . requires God’s existence” because “If God does not exist, objective
moral values do not exist.” (125–126) This premise is, however,
a strange way to begin an argument at this point in our book,
because I already showed in Chapter 2 why that premise is dubious
at best. Rape is morally wrong because it harms the victim, even if
there is no God; so objective moral values can and do exist without
God. Moreover, atheists can consistently and justifiably believe in
moral values as much as theists can. Just consider all of the nonreligious
moral theories that philosophers develop.
Where does all of this leave us? Craig is not convinced by my arAtheism
Undaunted 149
guments. Nor am I convinced by his. That impasse should not surprise
anyone. The more important question is whether our arguments
provide reasons for open-minded inquirers who are not previously
committed either for or against the existence of God.
Craig’s arguments constantly depend on a prior belief in God.
How else could he hold that a child’s dying of leukemia and Mao’s
Cultural Revolution were good? How else could he start arguments
with phrases like “Once we reflect on God’s providence . . . ”? (119)
How else could he think that the problem of evil could be solved by
Christian doctrines like “The purpose of life is . . . knowing God”
(120) and “God’s purpose spills over into eternal life”? (123) None
of these claims has any force for anyone who is not already committed
to the existence of God.
In contrast, I tried to base my arguments on commonsense standards
of reasonable belief and adequate compensation. These principles
are not peculiar to atheists. Most Christians also use the same
standards in their everyday lives. More importantly, these principles
are accepted by almost everyone who is not committed in advance
either for or against the existence of God. That makes them neutral
starting points.
Of course, when you put these principles together with obvious
facts, they yield the conclusion that God does not exist. Otherwise
my argument could not work. But that is no problem for my argument.
Every argument has to start from premises that lead to its
conclusion. The strategy in a good argument is to start from premises
that are independent of the conclusion in the sense that the
premises would and should be accepted by people who are not already
committed one way or the other about the conclusion. My
premises pass this test. Craig’s do not. That is why I conclude that
my arguments provide better reasons to believe that God does not
exist.
Notes
1. Craig’s guarding term “just” is misleading, because neither I nor anyone
else believes that all God cares about is “getting you to believe that He exists.”
Any all-good God would care about many things other than belief in Him. But
that does not mean that belief in God is not one of the things that God would
care about, at least instrumentally as a means to other goods.
150 God?
2. For more arguments that external (or Cambridge) changes cannot cause
effects, see Sections I–II of Sydney Shoemaker, “Causality and Properties,” in
his Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984),
206–209.
3. At several points Craig says that I adopt or assume a view that I do not
hold and that my argument does not depend on. When the ascribed view is implausible
or absurd, this common rhetorical trick might lead some readers to
distrust anyone who would hold such a view. That danger makes it tempting to
respond to each charge, but then I would not have space for more important
issues. For that reason, I will restrain myself and not bother to respond to each
accusation. My silence should not be misconstrued as an admission of Craig’s
claims.
4. My brief argument against agent causation derives from C. D. Broad,
“Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism,” in his Ethics and the History
of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1952), 195–217. For more arguments,
see Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1970), 80–85; and Hilary Bok, Freedom and Responsibility
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 44 ff.
5. There, Craig says that premise (1) “is not obviously true” and has been
questioned by “ome theists.” (126) Since he uses the third person, he does
not seem to share these theists’ views. In any case, Craig says how I would respond
to those theists. His only criticism of my response brings the issue back
to premise (3). That is why I focus only on premise (3) in my text.
6. Here are a few examples: “the envisioned revelation might lead to selfstultifying
situations.” (119) Maybe, but couldn’t an all-powerful God avoid this
problem? “Many evils occur in life that are utterly gratuitous with respect to
the goal of producing human happiness; but they may not be gratuitous with
respect to producing a deeper knowledge of God.” (120) Or they may be gratuitous
in that respect as well. The question is not what “might” or “may” be,
but what we have adequate reason to believe
INDEX
A
Ackerman, Susan, 51 n. 2, 56
action, problem of, 61, 98–101,
110–112, 134–138
Acts, 110
actual infinite. See infinite,
actual vs. potential
Adam, 90
Adams, Robert M., 68, 77 n. 22
advertisements for God, 109,
133
agnosticism, 81, 107–108, 129
Alston, William, 27, 68, 77 n. 22,
116, 119
analogies, 12, 16, 38, 39, 44,
46, 47, 48, 89, 90, 92, 96,
98, 100, 104, 114–115,
117, 124–125, 135, 144
argument from ignorance. See
ignorance, argument from
atheism, 3, 81, 107–108, 129
atheistic moral realism, 19–20,
34, 67
B
Barrow, John, 15, 60
beg(ging) the question, 7,
48–49, 58, 96, 141, 148
Ben and Jerry, 38
Big Bang, 4–5, 9, 32, 43–45,
49, 60–61, 64, 132, 148
Big Crunch, 61
bloated conclusions, fallacy of,
32, 50, 53–54, 131
Bohm, David, 6
Boltzmann, Ludwig, 14–15, 66
Brandenburger, Robert, 13
Buddhists, 82
burden of proof, 139–145
C
Carr, B. J., 64
causation, 5, 8, 45, 100–101
agent causation, 111–112,
137–138, 150 n. 4
whatever begins to exist has
a cause, 8–9, 56
chance, 10–11, 49, 64–67
change, external or extrinsic,
111, 135–136, 150 n. 2
chaos theory, 117, 139
Chaotic Inflationary Universe
theory, 8, 13, 117
Collins, Robin, 63–66
common sense, 142–144, 149
Copenhagen Interpretation, 6,
56–57
Corinthians, 123
151
152 Index
cosmological argument, 41, 56,
125, 147
creator of universe, 31, 50–51,
53–54, 125, 131, 148
Crusades, 82
Cyclical Model, 76 n. 12
D
Davies, P. C. W., 9, 10
debating God’s existence, ix-xi
defeaters, 59
Deltete, Robert, 6
Dembski, William, 65–66
design(er), 10, 13–14, 16–17,
31, 47, 50–51, 53, 65–66,
125
determinism, 68, 111, 136–137
divide and conquer strategy,
115–116, 146
divine commands. See morality,
divine command theories
of
Down’s syndrome, 84, 90–91
E
Eddington, Sir Arthur, 5
equivocation, fallacy of, 33
Euthyphro dilemma, 35–36,
68–69
Eve, 90
evidence, 36, 39, 48, 83, 85,
94, 96, 103–106, 127 n. 1,
130–131, 140–142
evil, 86, 138
justified, 87–88
natural, 93, 96–97, 117, 121
evil, problem of, 83–98, 101,
112–127, 138–149
apparently gratuitous
suffering, 114, 116–120,
124–126, 138, 142
contrast response, 89
emotional problem, 112
free will response, 92
glorious response, 92, 115
heavenly response, 91, 116,
123, 143–144
intellectual problem, 112,
127
internal vs. external version,
113–114, 127
logical vs. evidential version,
86, 113–114, 124
modest response, 95–97,
117–119
overriding response, 97,
124
permitting evil, 116–119,
123–124, 126, 145
privation response, 89
punishment response, 90
standard response, 94–95
unconscious response, 89
virtuous response, 91,
115–116, 143–144
evolution, 15, 17–20, 33, 49
excessive footnotes, fallacy of,
32, 55–56
experience, religious, 25–28,
31, 38–40, 51, 53–54,
73–74, 103, 125, 131
expert testimony, appeals to,
55–56
explanation, 16, 45, 50, 66,
100
simplicity vs. familiarity, 66
Index 153
F
fallacies. See begging the
question; bloated
conclusions; equivocation;
excessive footnotes; false
dichotomy; genetic;
ignorance, argument
from; inverse gambler’s;
straw man
false dichotomy, fallacy of, 32,
54–55
familiarity, 66
fine-tuning argument, 9–17,
46–50, 52 n. 13, 62–67
France, R. T., 55
free will (and freedom), 34, 68,
90, 92–93, 111, 117,
136–137, 145
G
Genesis, 110
genetic fallacy, 20
Gert, Bernard, 86
ghosts, 103
God
all-good, 31, 83–86, 97–98,
105, 112–114, 125, 134,
138–139, 145, 147–148
all-knowing (omniscient), 31,
83, 117, 133–134
all-powerful (omnipotent),
31, 51, 83–85, 97–98, 105,
112–114, 117, 119, 125,
133–134, 138–139,
147–148
changeless, 5, 54, 99, 135–136
effective (active in time), 31,
83, 98, 101
eternal and timeless, 5, 8,
31, 46, 83, 98–101,
110–111, 134–138
gender, 51n. 1
immaterial, 5, 54, 98
personal, 5–6, 31, 45–46, 54,
61, 83, 111
temporal, 61, 99–100,
110–111, 134–138
transcendent, 8
uncaused, 5, 54
unity, 131, 148
Gödel, Kurt, 42
Grand Unified Theories,
76 n. 10
Grass, Hans, 71
Great Pumpkin, 102
H
Hawking, Stephen, 8, 9, 32,
43–44, 55, 75 n. 9
Healey, John, 18, 32
Hengel, Martin, 71
Hick, John, 26, 32
Hilbert, David, 4, 32, 42,
75 n. 8
Hindus, 74, 82, 124
holocaust, 17
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, 124
Hoyle, Fred, 4, 32
Hume, David, 5, 32, 73
I
ignorance, argument from, 96,
101–105, 107–110,
129–134
as sometimes fallacious, 104,
130
154 Index
infinite, actual vs. potential, 4,
7, 41–43, 57–59, 75 n. 8
Inquisition, 21, 80
inverse gambler’s fallacy, 14
Isham, Christopher, 60
Islam, 83
J
James, 28, 109
Jesus, burial and resurrection
of, 21–25, 32, 36–38, 51,
55, 69–73, 125, 131
Jews, 23–24, 71, 82–83
John, 23, 72, 109
Johnson, Luke, 24
Johnstone, Patrick, 121, 146
Joseph of Arimathea, 22,
24–25, 72
Jude, 110, 134–135
K
Kanitscheider, Bernulf, 57
Kasner, Edward, 57–58
Kenny, Anthony, 4
kingdom of God, 120–123
Kremer, Jacob, 23, 55
L
law (of nature), 10, 36, 44,
63–64, 67, 73, 100
Lemaitre, 43
Leslie, John, 10
life, intelligent, 9, 46–50, 62
Linde, Andrei, 13–14
Linus, 102
Lloyd-Jones, Martyn, 120
Lüdemann, Gerd, 23–24
Luke, 72, 109
M
Many Worlds Hypothesis,
12–15, 49–50, 62, 63,
65–67
Mao, 121, 146–147, 149
Mark, 22–23, 37
Mathematics. See also infinite
calculus, 41, 58
constructivism in, 51n. 5, 58
numbers, 57–58, 98–99
platonism in, 57–58
set theory, 6, 57–58, 75 n. 7
transfinite arithmetic, 7,
58
Matthew, 23, 72
McCullagh, C. B., 24
Messianic expectations, 24, 37,
71
mind, 16, 135
miracle, 36–38, 69, 73, 78 n. 30,
84, 88, 103
Mithras, 37, 56, 71
moral agency, 68
moral argument, 125, 147
moral epistemology vs. moral
ontology, 69
morality, 17–21, 32–36, 67–69,
87–88, 117, 121, 131, 145,
148
divine command theories of,
35–36, 50, 68–69
evolution and, 17, 20
objectivity of, 17, 21, 69
Multiple Cosmoi Hypothesis.
See Many Worlds
Hypothesis
Murray O’Hare, Madelyn,
107
Index 155
N
natural disasters, 85, 93
natural law. See law of nature
Newman, James, 57–58
Nielsen, Kai, 5, 28 n. 5
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 17–18,
32–33
nothing, cannot get something
from, 6, 9, 44, 57
O
Ockham’s Razor, 13
origin of universe. See
universe, origin of
Oscillating Universe theory, 8, 61
P
Padgett, Alan, 110
Paul, 22–23, 123
pedophile, 93–94
Penrose, Roger, 9
Plantinga, Alvin, 28, 113
Plato, 69
Polkinghorne, John, 13
possibility, logical, 36, 94,
139–140, 150 n. 6
probability, 47, 62, 140–141
likelihood principle, 48, 65
specified, 11–12, 141
problem of action. See action,
problem of
problem of evil. See evil,
problem of
properly basic beliefs, 26–28,
40, 125, 127 n. 1
Proverbs, 110
Psalms, 110, 134
purpose of life, 120, 146, 149
Q
quantum epoch, 43–45
Quantum Gravity Universe
theory, 8
Quinn, Philip, 68, 77 n. 22
quintessence, 63
R
Rees, M. J., 64
religion, 82
religious schools, history of, 71
Robinson, John A. T., 22
Romans, 109
Ruse, Michael, 17, 18, 32–33,
55
Russell, Bertrand, 17, 18,
32–33
S
Salmon, Wesley, 55
Schultz, Charles, 102
Shepard, Matthew, 82
shotgun strategy, 31, 53
simplicity, 49, 56, 66
singularity, initial cosmological,
8, 60, 75 n. 9
Smith, Mark S., 71
space, 4–5, 43, 98–101
stem cell research, 82
straw man, fallacy of attacking
a, 34, 108
strong evidence principle, 130
supersymmetry, 75–76 n. 10
T
Taoism, 27
Taylor, Richard, 19–20
teleological argument, 41
156 Index
theism, 3
time, 98–101
classical, 43–44
metaphysical, 8, 46, 61
physical, 8, 43
Timothy, 110
Tipler, Frank, 15, 60
Titus, 110
tracker fields, 49, 52 n. 13, 63
U
universe. See also Big Bang;
fine-tuning
astronomy and astrophysical
discoveries, 4, 59, 61
cosmic acceleration, 61, 63
finite or infinite, 3–4, 6,
41–42, 52 n. 8, 57–58
origin of, 3–9, 41–46, 56–61
sub-atomic events and origin
of, 6, 44–45
thermodynamic equilibrium,
14
utilitarianism, 86, 88
V
Vacuum Fluctuation Universe
theory, 8, 52 n. 8, 57, 60
W
World Ensemble. See Many
Worlds Hypothesis
Wright, N. T., 24
Z
zero, 41–42, 58
